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Book Reviews

Women Under the Laiw': The False Promise of Human Rights. By AILEEN
MCCOLGAN. [Harlow: Longman. 1999. xxxiv and 310 pp. Paperback.
£17.99. IBSN 0-582-29451-7.]
"THE aim of this book is to challenge the view ...that 'rights' are, in
general, a 'good thing"' (p. 1) and "to consider how constitutionally
entrenched and judicially applied rights have benefited or disadvantaged
women" (p. 32). The claim is that statutory schemes are preferable to
"'entrenched' or 'constitutional' rights, such as those introduced into UK
law by the Human Rights Act 1998," because they are more effective in
protecting women and other disadvantaged groups (pp. 1-2).
Methodologically, the book analyses the legal status of women in three
areas-reproduction, employment, and violence by and against womenand claims that the conclusions drawn apply to other disadvantaged groups
and other areas of law. The United States and Canada are used to
illustrate the constitutional approach to rights, while Britain exemplifies the
statutory approach.
Though McColgan's book promises much, it fails to persuade the
reader for several reasons. First, a number of the examples used to
demonstrate the inferiority of entrenched rights actually suggest the
opposite. For instance, the book criticises entrenched rights because they
allow the judiciary to strike down legislation, thus thwarting the expression
of democratic will. Because McColgan views the judiciary as an essentially
conservative institution, accountable to no one, she prefers to trust the
legislature to protect the rights of disadvantaged groups. To demonstrate
the soundness of her theory, McColgan compares the status of abortion in
the US and Ireland, claiming that the backlash against the landmark 1973
US decision of Roe v. Wade has proven detrimental to women. Had the
US opted for statutory rather than constitutional change, women might
have had to wait longer for the right to control their procreative lives, but
would have had a more secure status once the right was recognised. The
1992 Irish case of X v. Attorney General is used to illustrate the alternative
approach; although abortion was absolutely prohibited in Ireland, the
'horror of forcing a 14 year-old victim of rape to return to Ireland from
England to await the birth of an unwanted child led the country to modify
its law.
The case is an odd one to use to demonstrate the superiority of
statutory rights, since the individual's right to travel for an abortion was
established by the Irish Supreme Court, based on the language of the
Constitution. The legislative action McColgan alludes to took the form of a
constitutional amendment that merely reinforced the judiciary's stance. The
politicization of the abortion issue that McColgan finds so problematic in
the US might have come about not because constitutional rights are
inherently suspect but because, as many commentators have recognised,
Roe v. Wade did not constitute the ideal test case. X v. Attorney General,
with its innocent child victim, did. In addition, the US recognised the right
to abortion relatively early, while Ireland did so only after most other
Western nations had done so, and only to a very limited extent. Therefore,
there are other reasons besides the constitutional-statutory dichotomy that
would explain the differences in the two nations' approaches to abortion.
McColgan's distrust of the judiciary leads to other dubious arguments.
For example, she claims that legislators in systems with entrenched rights
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often pass laws that they know will be stricken by the courts as
unconstitutional, since they believe that such tactics gain them credibility
with conservative voters without alienating those of a more liberal bent.
Again, this conclusion seems unwarranted, since liberal voters are not likely
to forget their representatives' acts, symbolic or otherwise, merely because
those acts have been judicially overruled. McColgan also fails to
acknowledge that lawmakers in nations without entrenched rights may pass
oppressive laws if they think their constituents want such laws; however, in
those cases, those who are disadvantaged as a result are without a remedy.
Again, X v. Attorney General suggests that constitutional regimes, even
those that appear highly restrictive of certain rights, can be superior to
statutory schemes, since the judiciary can step in to protect individuals
when necessary.
The second reason why McColgan fails to persuade results from her
forcing constitutional arguments where there are none. For example, she
insists on analyzing whether the US Constitution offers any protection to
women who want to raise a "battered woman" defence or who want to
limit intensely personal and arguably irrelevant cross-examination in rape
cases. Such an approach suggests either a misunderstanding of the US
Constitution or the construction of a straw man argument, easily overcome
in rebuttal. Constitutions are not meant to be comprehensive and do not
necessarily bear on all situations. The cited examples cannot demonstrate
the ills of entrenched systems of rights because they are not constitutional
issues: they are instead matters of state criminal law and procedure.
The inappropriate application of constitutional law is troubling in a
book that is intended to compare such systems of law to statutory regimes.
While one expects (and indeed hopes) to find unusual arguments in a book
of this sort, such arguments must be based on reasonable interpretations of
existing law. Otherwise, they are too easily discounted. Fundamental errors
about one of the primary jurisdictions under discussion (such as the claim
that there are 52 US states when there are only 50) also do little to
convince the reader of the author's point of view.
The third problem with this book is its failure to extrapolate its
arguments about women to other disadvantaged groups. Although there
are some references to ethnic and racial minorities in the discussion of
affirmative action, there is no mention of what other groups might benefit
from the author's analysis. Similarly, the author fails to tell the reader
what areas of law other than reproduction, employment, and violence by
and against women would benefit from her analysis. This omission is
unfortunate, since the wider applicability of the study would have been one
of its major benefits.
Despite these shortcomings, there is much in McColgan's book to
recommend it. Her prose is fluid, her presentation of US and Canadian
law, particularly regarding abortion, is extensive, and her arguments are
clearly made. In fact, the author's ability to introduce such a large amount
of information may work against her, for it gives the impression that she is
cataloguing the laws in the various jurisdictions rather than comparing
them. Indeed, the absence of a more rigorous comparative analysis of the
two approaches leaves one with the sense that the most important work
has yet to be done. Had the author been able to deliver what was
promised, this book would have posed a powerful challenge to notions of
human rights and constitutional protections as traditionally conceived.
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Nevertheless, McColgan has produced a work that, while falling short of
its goal, provides the reader with a great deal of information and
considerable food for thought.
S.I. STRONG
Practical Reason and Norms. By JOSEPH RAZ. [Oxford: Oxford University
Press. 1999. 177, (Postscript) 22, (Notes and References) 18, (Index) 3
pp. Paperback. £17.99 net. ISBN 0-19-826834-3.]
O.xford Essays in Jurisprudence: Fourth Series. Edited by JEREMY HORDER.
[Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2000. ix, 263, (Index) 6 pp.
Hardback. £45.00. ISBN 0-19-826858-0.]
two books mark quite different stages in Oxonian jurisprudence
during the second half of the twentieth century. The first edition of Joseph
Raz's book, published in 1975, appeared in a decade when H.L.A. Hart
was still productive and when some of Hart's former students (Raz, Ronald
Dworkin, John Finnis, Neil MacCormick) published a number of
important works. By contrast, the volume edited by Jeremy Horder has
appeared eight years after Hart's death, at a juncture when most of Hart's
prominent jurisprudential students are no longer at Oxford or are splitting
their time between Oxford and other institutions. One striking feature of
the fourth series of the OxJord Essays in Jurisprudence is that nine of the
thirteen contributors are erstwhile rather than current Oxonians. A tenth
contributor, John Finnis, divides his time between Oxford and the
University of Notre Dame in Indiana. (To be sure, one of the nine exOxonians John Gardner will return to Oxford in 2001.)
Practical Reason and Norms is unchanged from the second edition,
which was published by the Princeton University Press in 1990 and which
included for the first time a Postscript on the book's central idea of
exclusionary reasons. Any serious reader should recognize the volume's
rigor, sophistication, subtlety, and admirably ambitious sweep. It remains
Raz's most impressive achievement. Although the present reviewer has
elsewhere endeavored to show that a number of the book's central
arguments are unsuccessful, the very forcefulness of those arguments is
what makes them worthy of being sustainedly challenged.
One regrettable aspect of the second edition of Practical Reason and
Norms is the shift in Raz's citational practice between 1975 and 1990.
Whereas the main part of the book contains citations to numerous works
on practical reason and related topics, the 1990 Postscript cites hardly any
writings other than those of Raz himself. Though Hart was surely correct
to maintain (in the Preface to The Concept of La) that the development
of jurisprudential thought cannot flourish if books on the subject are
written primarily in order to encapsulate what other books contain, the
work of Hart himself and of the early Raz is a testament to the fruitfulness
of engaging directly with the writings and arguments of other scholars.
The fourth series of the O.xjbrd Essays in Jurisprudence is a more
modest undertaking than Raz's book, but on the whole it is a good
volume. Most of the essays are thoughtful, careful, and lucid, though
virtually every one of them is open to a number of objections (sometimes
far-reaching objections). Because there is no room here to evaluate the
essays one by one, and because it would be invidious to single out only a
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